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Citizenship Law, Nationalism and the Theft
of Enjoyment
A Post-Colonial Narrative
Roshan De Silva Wijeyeratne
The status of ~ationalism is ultimately that of the transcendental
illusion, the illusion of a direct access to the Thing
-Slavoj Zizek
Introduction·
My focus here is on the debates and law on citizenship -in Sri
Lanka. 1 I shall consider the extent to which The Ceylon Citizenship
Act, 1948 (which restricted the status ofCeylon citizen to anyone
who could claim it by descent or registration and as a result
disenfranchised a large proportion of the 700,000 Indian Tamil
plantation workforce), fails to establish a self-constituting
foundation for the granting of citizenship. I go on to suggest
that such legislation can only function by virtue of the
(im)possibility ofexcluding the Tamil other, that is the problem
oflocating the other. This {im)possibility, I shall argue is another
name for Derridean differance, the other never absolutely
excluded, but never absolutely included either, within the textual
framework ofthis legislation. The inherent anxiety ofthe relation
between the demarcation of citizenship for the Sinhalese and
citizenship for the Indian Tamils is elaborated upon in a discussion
that draws on Zizek's (1991 a, 1993) psychoanalytical account of
nationalism/national identification as the 'theft of enjoyment'.2
Just as the Sinhalese Buddhist nation exhibits an anxious moment
that unsettles the certainty of the relation between the Sinhalese
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and the Tamil other, the other whose proximity undermines the
possibility of national coherance and consistency, The Crylon
Citizenship Actand its derivative legislation similarly experiences
this problem of 'placing' the Indian Tamil other. As with the
following discussion of the limit of Sinhalese Buddhist
nationalism, my emphasis with reference to the law on citizenship
is with an alterity that can never be absolutely excluded. But first
I shall elaborate upon Derridas concept ofdifferance.
Derrida And The Critique Of Semiology
Derrida locates the possibility ofdifferance in his deconstructive
reading of Saussure's structural linguistics. While Saussure
established that signs do not have meaning in and of themselves
as positive terms and instead establish their meaning within the
systematic play of difference, the task of deconstruction is to
problematise the relation between signs that guarantee for
Saussure the integrity oflanguage as a system ofsigns. Differance
announces a double movement, firstly of spacing, that is of
differing, to be spatially non-identical, to be other and secondly
of temporisation, that is of deferring, to be temporally delayed.
As a consequence, meaning adequating to a classical economy of
representation is continually deferred, thus preventing the sign
from ever coinciding with itself
As to the first movement of spacing or differing, the
immediate consequence of Saussure's classification is that each
sign is inscribed in a chain in which it refers to the other by
means of this play ofdifference (Derrida 1982: 11). The sign is
therefore only ever present by means ofthe relation it has to that
which it is not (Derrida 1982: 13). Each sign carries with it the
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trace ofsomething, its other againstwhich the sign has constituted
itself. By the trace Derrida alludes to the ghost or mark of the
past that is inscribed in the present moment, a present that is
deferred (Derrida 1982: 13). Because the sign stands in for the
'thing itself', the sign is, in this respect, a 'deferred presence'
(Derrida 1982: 9).
The sign signifies a deferred presence by which as Derrida
notes '[w]hether we are concerned with the verbal or written
sign ... with electoral delegation and political representation, the
circulation of the sign defers the moment in which we can
encounter the thing itself' (ibid). The movement of the sign to
presence is therefore conceivable only on 'the basis ofthe presence
that it defers' (ibid). The movement towards presence must travel
through the detour of differance. Consequently presence is
interrupted by differance. To the extent that there is difference,
it is both produced and deferred by differance (Derrida 1982:
14). What follows is an elaboration of the concept of differance
through Sinhalese nationalism and the law on citizenship.
Deconstructing The Sinhala Nation
Underpinning much of the work of British writers in the early
and middle nineteenth century were the two assumptions that
'in ancient times there was a great Sinhala civilisation, which
later went into decline: and that distinct and often antagonistic
ethnic groups existed throughout the island's long history' (Rogers
in Spencer (ed) 1990: 87). These images were reinforced when,
from 1833, both Indologists and colonial administrators began
assessing the truth value of the Pali Chronicles which recorded
the relationship between the pre-colonial kings ofSri Lanka and
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Buddhism from the fifth to the twelfth century (Kemper 1991:
53-78).3 Colonial historiography began to project Victorian
concepts of 'race' onto the people and events described in the
Chronicles. In time 'religion and race became criteria ofdifference
between people, and such difference overrode practices and beliefs
that Sinhala's and Tamils shared' (Kemper 1991: 159).
This 'positivistic historiography) (Collingwood, cited by
]eganathan in Jegenathan and Ismail (ed) 1995: 109) based on
the affirmation or the Chronicles as an 'authentic' history of the
island (Collingwood, cited by Jeganathan in Jegenathan and
Ismail (ed) 1995: 112-17) in which history and identity- were
simply objectively represented was one that Sinhalese Buddhist
nationalists such as the Anagarika Dharmapala actively
appropriated. 4 For example in a pamphlet from 1902,
Dharmapala claimed that 'the Sinhala are a unique race, inasmuch
as they have no slave blood in them, and never were conquered
by either the pagan Tamils or European vandals' (cited by Kemper
1991: 200). He continues that with the onset of colonial rule,
the 'Sinhalese has lost his true identity and become a hybrid'
(cited 'by Kemper 1991: 200). But what this strategy reveals is
that the Tamil other can never be fully excluded from the Sinhalese
natIon.
In Dharmapala's narrative, the 'pagan Tamils' constitute
the reference against which the Sinhala nation is 'imagined).5
The ambivalence of the -relation between the Sinhala nation and
the 'pagan Tamils' ensures that the difference between the two
can never absolutely be established, for the sign'Sinhala natiod
fails to achieve- pure referentiality in the order of presence. In
this respect then the 'Sinhala nation' is subject to the play of
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differance as its immanent identity is interrupted by the Tamil
other who is simultaneously included and excluded. Inscribed in
the 'Sirthala nation' is the trace of its other, both against and
within which it is 'imagined'. The play of this trace interrupts
the possibility of the 'Sinhala nation' ever having either a present
or pure 'origin'.6
It is the very failure of exclusion which ensures that the
'Sinhala nation' remains insufficiently Sinhalese, while
simultaneously remaining 'unable to accommodate' (Perrin 1996:
107) the difference of the other. In effect the Tamil other
constitutes the 'limit' of the nation, constantly re-drawing the
line as it 'crosses the nation (Perrin 1996: 107). Just as the sign
refuses an absolute presence, the 'Sinhala nation' as an immanent
purity can never be established as an unequivocal presence. To
the extent that Dharmapala 'imagines' the nation, that which is
'imagined' must have a referent point, an object to be 'imagined'
and it is precisely the presupposition ofan object to be 'imagined'
by reference to an other that disrupts the object it describes. In
deconstructive terms this precludes that which is 'imagined'
through language from being absolutely present in and of itself
Indeed, if the 'Sinhala nation' could ever be fully realised it would
'also be its dissolution (Perrin 1996: 107). Having established
the 'limit' point,ofSinhalese nationalism, the failure toabsolute1y
exclude or include the difference that is the Tamil other my focus
now turns to a deconstructivereading of the law on citizenship.
Citizenship, The Other And Differance
The issue of citizenship or rather the denial of citizenship to the
Indian Tamils has vexed the political psyche of Sri Lanka for
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much of this century. The Indian Tamils were introduced to Sri
Lanka from South India by the British as bonded labour to work
on the coffee and then tea plantations, principally around Kand})
between 1852 and the 19305. As they were bonded labour, it
was naively expected on the part of the colonial authorities that
they would eventually return to South India. Naturally very few
did, particularly those that were born in Sri Lanka. A major
question that the colonial and later post-colonial authorities faced
was the extent to which citizenship rights s~ould be extended to
this section of the labour force.
This issue becam·e intimately connected to the increased
agitation for self-rule between 1900-1931 (de Silva 1986: 49-
51) and the gradual enlargement of the electoral register. Those
campaigning for change were conservative reformers (who in
1919 went onto form the Ceylon National Congress as the
principle force for pragmatic change) who were opposed to
bringing the masses into politics (de Silva 1986: 50). Under
pressure, the British gradually increased the electoral register and
the size ofthe legislature. Eventually in 1927 the Colonial Office
appointed the Donoughmore Commission to look into the
possibilitY of further constitutional reform in Ceylon.
In June 1928 the Commission published its report and its
most controversial recommendation was that universal suffrage
be introduced (de Silva 1986: 52-3).7 The Commission also
recommended the enfranchisement of the Indian Tamils on
similar terms to the indigenous population. For the Kandyan
Sinhalese (the Indian Tamils were represented in large numbers
in distriCts around Kandy, under the employment of the British
plantation owners) this represented a potential threat to their
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political interests. The Legislative Council only accepted the
report after the Colonial Office altered the proposals of the
Commission and placed restrictions on the franchise ofthe Indian
Tamils. They made domicile the test for the franchise and devised
other provisions for those undomiciled (de Silva 1986: 54). These
provisions were incorporated into sections 7 and 9 of the Ceylon
State Council (Elections) Order-in-Council, 1931. In this respect
then the legislation encompassed the citizenship rights of the
Tamil other in a hierarchical relation, their rights subordinate to
that of the Sinhalese majority. The issue of citizenship rights of
the Indian Tamils was to continue to be an emotive issue on the
path to independence. Ironically, universal suffrage which by the
1936 general election brought about an all Sinhalese Board of
Ministers, saw the simultaneous emergence of Sinhala-Tamil
rivalries (Russell 1982: 243-67, de Silva 1986: 58-60) as theTamil
political leadership began to realise its status as a minority.8
During the deliberations of the Soulbury Commission on
independence the Indian Tamil leadership argued that in view of
the discriminatory impact of the 1931 legislation, both the
franchise and immigration (principally from South India) should
be reserved for the British Government under any new
constitutional settlement. The Commission rejected their
argument and the failure of Sri Lankan and Indian delegations
to resolve the "residency period under which all Indian Tamils
would acquire citizenship resulted in D S Senanayake's first post-
independence administration imposing its own settlement in
1948-49. The Citizenship Bill was introduced into Parliament
in August 1948. Under the terms of this Bill, citizenship was to
be acquired by descent (Section 4) and registration (Section 11).
Under the terms of the Bill, particularly those relating to
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citizenship by descent, many Indian Tamils who had voted in
the 1948 general election were to become disenfranchised.
Under the terms of the Act, Section 4(1), provided for
citizenship by descent. Under Section 4(1) a person born in
Ceylon before the appointed date was to acquire Ceylon
citizenship by descent if,
(a) his father was born in Ceylon, or
(b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather was
born in Ceylon.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a person born
outside Ceylon before the appointed date shall have the status
ofa citizen of Ceylon by descent, if
(a) his father and paternal grandfather were born in Ceylon, or
(b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather
were born in Ceylon.
s 5(1) Subject to the other provisions ofthis Part, a person born
in Ceylon on or after the appointed date shall have the status of
a citizen of Ceylon by descent if at the time of his birth his
father is a citizen of Ceylon.
Sections 4 (2) (a) and (b) were designed to assist Sri Lankan
Tamils who had settled in Malaysia, (usually in the employment
of the colonial state) so that if the applicant's father had settled
in Malaysia, but his paternal grandfather or _great grandfather
had been born in Sri Lanka, then the applicant would be entitled
to Ceylon citizenship by descent. But as G G Ponnambalam (the
leader of the Tamil Congress) pointed out during the Committee
stage ofthe Bill, leaving aside the exercise ofministerial discretion,
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in the event that proofcould notbe found (Section 5 (2», finding
such proof would be 'impossible in the case of a person who is
domiciled here, in spite of his having property here and settled
down here [referring indirectly to the Indian Tamils] or one who
is settled down in Malaya, by his having to p-roduce the legal
content of this subsection by proof of birth in respect of his
grandfather and great grandfather' (Hansard House of
Representatives (1948) Vol IV: Col 1831). Furthermore as W
Dahanayake pointed out '[h]ow can one prove that a paternal
great grandfather was born in Ceylon because, very likely, he
may have been born even before the advent of the British'
(Hansard House of Representatives (1948) Vol IV: Col 1832).
The practical difficulty of acquiring such proof, which it seems
Senanayake's Government clearly and cynically took advantage
of, was exacerbated by the fact that the official registration of
births only began in 1875 (Hansard House of Representatives
(1948) Vol IV: Col t838) and so consequently it would be very
difficult to prove the birth)of a grandfather or great grandfather
in Ceylon.
By implication then sections 4 (2) (a) and (b) were designed
to disenfranchise a large proportion of Indian Tamils who could
not prove that either their father, paternal grandfather or paternal
great grandfather were born in Ceylon. Furthermore, the child
of an Indian Tamil born after the appointed date will not be a
citizen of Ceylon because his father is not a Ceylonese citizen,
even though born in Ceylon (Hansard House of Representatives
(1948) Vol IV: Col 1833-1835), even when a brother/sister born
before the appointed date would become a citizen. The terms of
the Act were classically hierarchical, the Indian Tamils
encompassed within a legislative regime that implicitly privileges
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the citizenship ofthe Sinhalese. As G R Motha, the representative
ofthe Ceylon Indian Congress (the political party that represented
the Indian Tamils) observed, not only would many Indian Tamils
be unable to prove their paternal genealog}T, but that, while at
least implicitly the 'Sinhalese community is automatically
recognised, it will be incumbent on the others [particularly Indian
Tamils] to prove their citizenship' (Hansard House of
Representatives (1948) Vol IV: Col 1790, my interpolation).
Motha went on to observe that 'if his name, instead of being,
say, Rajalingham or Rajaratnam [Tamil names], is Rajakaruna
[Sinhala name], probably nobody would inquire from him where
his father was born' (ibid: Col 1790, my interpolation). As a
requirement of administering the Act, it would be necessary for
officials to ask for proof from people belonging to the Indian
Tamil community, but not the Sinhalese community.
Consequently the effect of the Act was indirectly discriminatory
against the Indian Tamils.9 The legislation was also potentially
discriminatory against Sri Lankan Tamils who could similarly be
asked by officials administering the Act to prove their paternal
genealogy.
In his observation that the 'Sinhalese community is
automatically recognised', Motha unwittingly captures the 'limie
point which sustains the (im)possible meaning of this Act. The
paternal genealogy ofthe Sinhalese is assumed by virtue ofSinhala
names and it is the Indian Tamil other that must prove his/her
genealogy. But characteristic ofthis Act is the failure to construct
its terms ofreference, the Sinhalese and the Indian Tamil other. 10
As such this act of construction is left to the administering
officials. But the failure to construct the other still renders the
Act unable to adequately conceal the figure of alterity, the 'limit'
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that gives citizenship its foundation in Sri Lanka. To the extent
that the implicit automatic recognition of the Sinhalese people
as citizens is guaranteed by the Act (after all, officials administering
the Act were not going to ask for proof 0"£ paternal genealogy
when confronted by a person with a Sinhala name), citizenship
is still subject to an undecidable 'origin', a referent that refuses
an absolute presence, an other who similarly remains only
implicit.
As such, then, citizenship in .)ri Lanka retuses an absolute
point of 'origin'. This failure signals a simultaneous failure to
place the other. The very necessity to establish citizenship in Sri
Lanka through a system of genealogical proofs is a response,
therefore, to the loss ofthis point of'origin', an anxious moment
in the Act which signals implicitly 'that which is sought but cannot
be attained is ... a certainty ... a referent whose very loss lies at
the origin' (Lefort 1986: 211).11 In a certain sense it is the Sinhala
name that is sought as the 'origin' ofcitizenship, but that which
is implidt in the Act can never be made explicit, for that would
render the Act crudely ethnocentric, violating the liberal facade
that citizenship legislation must maintain. To the extent that it is
the Tamil name which stands as the 'origin' of citizenship, this
too remains concealed, a referent that is implicitly invoked 'only
in order to conceal its absence' (Perrin 1996: 101), but which
yet becomes manifest in the actual administration of the Act.
To the extent that the name of the Indian Tamil other
remains concealed, its very proximity to the Sinhala name,
implicit in theAct's requirement ofgenealogical proofand explicit
in the administration ofthe Act, is that which yet simultaneously
undermines the implicit, ifautomatic recognition ofthe Sinhalese
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community as citizens, given voice to by Motha. To the extent
that the Act is characterised by the loss ofimmanence, that is the
(im)possibility of an immanent identity that could give rise to
citizenship, what this other threatens (both implicitly and
explicitly at the level of the Act and administration respectively)
to do is not to undermine an (already established consistency',
but (to reveal an inconsistency which is only precariously
concealed' (Perrin 1996: 104).
As such this Indian Tamil other is neither fully included
nor fully excluded, and which in the absence of any self-
constituting foundation constitutes the 'limit' against which
citizenship is to be ascertained in Sri Lanka. The category 'citizen
of.Ceylon' can only be approached as a mediation through the
other that is implicit in the Act, that is the other who fails to
establish an adequate paternal genealogy. To the extent that
citizenship is determined by that which it seeks to exclude, it can
only do so on the basis of this implicit Indian Tamil other that it
simultaneously seeks to include. Consistent with my elaboration
of differance, the category 'citizen of Ceylon' persists through
the paradoxical (im)possibility of establishing the unequivocal
presence ofthe category 'citizen ofCeylon' arid the simultaneous
(im)possibility of 'establishing its unequivocal absence' (Perrin
1996: 17). Consequently, to the extent that this implicit other is
destined to have a relation to the category ofCeylon citizenship,
then this other constitutes the 'limit' ofcitizenship, a 'limit' that
does not deconstirute this implicit other, but which guarantees
the (im)possibility of citizenship.
In-between tP~Jwo opposites, citizenship and the implicit
Indian Tamil other resides differance, the other both, as and in
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the category 'citizen ofCeylon'. Developing my earlier argument
of the trace that is inscribed in the sign, the other as a trace is
inscribed in the category ofCeylon citizenship, the other against
which this category has constituted itself As such, the signifier
'citizen of Ceylon' can never be 'present in and of itself, in a
sufficient presence that would refer only to itself (Derrida in
Cornell et al (ed) 1992: 13). Consequently 'this difference, which
ought to have been: excluded, never was' (Perrin 1996: 104).
Citizenship And The Theft Of Enjoyment
The Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act 1949
provided for the application of the conditions of the Citienship
Act to Indian Tamils. Its principle objective was that it provided
for the granting of citizenship by registration to Indian Tamils
who had" fulfilled the qualification of residence in Ceylon for a
period ofseven years (Hansard House ofRepresentatives (1948)
Vol v; Col 524, 541-42). While this may have had the effect of
disenfranchising between 30,000-40,000 of the Indian Tamils
(Hansard House of Representatives (1948) Vol V: Col 541-42),
it was the requirement that the paternal father and paternal
grandfather of an Indian Tamil be horn in Ceylon that was to
result in disenfranchising most Indian Tamils. The requirement
of documentation (rare amongst a group of largely illiterate
workers) accompanied by a list ofwitnesses and affidavits was to
prove a further hindrance to the registration of Indian Tamils as
citizens (Hansard House of Representatives (1948) Vol V: Col
524, 541-42: Col 577-80). On top ofthis the total cost of2,OOO
Rupees that each application would entail, was to add to the
burden placed on indian Tamils seeking registration as citizens
(Hansard House ofRepresentatives (1948) Vol V: Col 578-79).12
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In the course ofthe debates surrounding this Act, the Prime
Minister, D S Senanayake made frequent reference to the Indian
Tamils having come from South India for reasons of economic
migration and as a consequence 'depriving the Kandyans of their
territory' (Hansard House of Representatives (1948) Vol V: Col
433), the purpose of the legislation being to restore the land
back to the landless Kandyan peasantry (Hansard House of
Representatives (1948) Vol V: Col 454-55, 496-97). Referring
to India, he observed that 'there were in the neighbouring country
people driven to such desperate measures that they thought that
rather than die in India they might cross over to Ceylon and get
a living although that might increase the hardship of the people
of this country' (Hansard House of Representatives (1948) Vol
V: Col 433). In addition to this, in Senanayake's na~rative, the
Indian Tamils brought with them diseases such as cholera with
the effect that they 'spread the disease amongst the villagers, so
that all that these immigrants did was that ~hey killed some of
the villagers' (Hansard House of Representatives (1948) Vol V:
Col. 433). To the extent that, in this Sinhalese narrative, the
Indian ,Tamils. 'stole' the land from the Kandyan peasantry, it
was the Left that pointed out that the opening up of the Kandyan
highlands for -the development of a commercial plantation
economy took place with the active support of the land owning
Kandyan aristocracy, many of whose descendants were
represented in Senanayake's Government (Hansard House of
Representatives (1948) Vol V: Col 452-454).13
This metaphor of 'thefe was consistently articulated by
Sinhalese politicians in favour of the legislation. For example A
Ratnayake said that '[c]he Indians in Ceylon are much better off
than the inhabitants of Ceylon at all levels' (Hansard House of
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Representatives (1948) Vol V: Col 485). In the view of M D
Banda they had medical facilities which were denied to the
Sinhalese villagers of Kandy and so had to be denied 'full rights'
(Hansard House ofRepresentatives (1948) Vol V: Col 514).14 In
a similar vein T B Panabokke observed that they have had
'maternity benefits and other benefits which were not available
to the people ofthis country' (Hansard House ofRepresentatives
(1948) Vol V: Col 527), and in T F Jayewardene's view 'the
Indians of this country have got more than they dese.rve. From
the small boutique in the village to the big business house in
Colombo every business is, to some extent, controlled by Indians'
(Hansard House ofRepresentatives (1948) Vol V: Col 528). Apart
from Sinhalese capital, in effect what the Indian Tamils threaten
is a certain Kandyan Sinhalese rural and ecologically harmonious
'way of life'.15 What I want to argue below is that' a Zizekian
approach can be of help in elaborating upon the essentially
indeterminate strategy of national identification taking place in
these debates on citizenship.16
Zizek's psychoanalytical account ofnationalism draws upon
Lacan's triadic schema of the Imaginary, the SymboJicand the
Real (Bowie 1991: 88-112). In this schema the Imaginary is a
transformative moment in which the subject assumes discrete
images ofothers in the social. To the extent that '[t]he Imaginary
is the scene ofa desperate delusional attempt to be and to remain
'what one is' by gathering to oneself ever more instances of
sameness, resemblance and self-replication' (Bowie 1991: 92),
the two dominant forms ofidentification present in the Imaginary
are both narcissistic and aggressive as the ego is split along the
axis of identification (Bowie 1991: 33-34, 92, Elliot 1994: 93-
95). If the Imaginary then is the scene of a primary alienation,
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the ego already 'becoming an 'other' to itself in the act of
contemplating' (Elliot 1994: 95) its 'relationship with the external
world of people and things' (Bowie 1991: 92), the Symbolic is
the scene ofa secondary alienation, the 'domain ofreceived social
meanings ... and differentiation - in and through which the [ego]
begins to represent desire and is thus constituted as a "subject'"
(Elliot 1994: 95, my interpolation).
It follows then that the Symbolic is truly 'intersubjective
and social' (Bowie 1991: 93), a domain that 'does not allow any
one of its members to be himself [or] keep himself to himself'
(Bowie 1991, n:ty interpolation). The Symbolic is anchored in
language, the 'medium in which desire is represented, and through
which the subject js constituted to itself and to others' (Elliot
1994: 95). It is language, conceptualised following Saussure "as a
system of signs that guarantees the 'intersubjective order of
symbolisation' (Eniot 1994: 95) once the subject is separated
'from the narcissistic fullness ofthe imaginary order' (Elliot 1994:
96).
But the attempt by the subject to represent him/herself
within this order proves an (im)possibiliry 'since the subject has
become an 'effect of the signifier', inserted into the spacings or
differences which constitute language itself (Elliot 1994: 96).
As such then language is 'a mask covering over the [im]possibility
of desire' (Elliot 1994: 96, my interpolation), as 'desire sinks or
fades into gaps which separate word from word, meaning from
meaning' (Elliot 1994: 96). That element which escapes
symbolisation Lac:ancalls the Real, the traumatic 'kernel of
enjoyment' (Zizek 1993: 202), 'a world that falls entirely and
irretrievably outside the signifying dimension' (Bowie 1991: 94).
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As such then, the Real signals that moment when the Symbolic
is fractured, a moment that is 'irreducible to the signifiers that
define him' (Bowie 1991: 103). As Lacan notes 'the real does not
wait, and specifically not for the subject, since it expects nothing
from the word' (cited by Bowie 1996: 95).
What is at stake in these debates on citizenship (in the Act
itself) is a relationship to the Thing (the national Thing), that
which has been lost, the void ofthis loss being filled out by means
of fantasies (Zizek 1993: 201).17 As such it is the other which
threatens a Sinhalese 'way oflife', as represented in some form of
primordial attachment that the Kandyan peasantry have to the
land 'stolen' by the other, as echoed in the narratives ofcitizenship
presented above. But the nationallourThingremainsparadoxical,
simultaneously 'conceived as something inaccessible to the other
and at the same time threatened by him' (Zizek 1991a: 165).18
But this national Thing remains, in a manner consistent with
deconstruction, inaccessible, only ever elusively present in what
Zizek calls 'our way of life', in the way a nation organises its
'collective enjoyment'· (Zizek 1991a: 165, Zizek 1993: 201).19
While the national Thing remains inaccessible, it yet
'appears' (Zizek 1993: 201) through this Sinhala 'way of life'. It
'appears' to the extent that the Sinhala politicians participating
in this 'way of life' 'believe in their Thing' (Zizek 1993: 201, his
emphasis) where belief in this national Thing has a 'reflexive
structure' (Zizek 1993: 202) so that beliefin the national Thing
'equals "I believe that others (m,embers ofmy community) believe
in the Thing'" (Zizek 1993: 202). As such then A Ratnayake
confirms this 'reflexive structure' when he cites the petition of
the Kandyan National Assembly against this legislation on the
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grounds that in 'the present Parliament, Kandyans living in no
less than six areas have virtually been disenfranchised as they do
not have the faintest prospect of their ever being able to be
represented by one of their race' (Ha.nsard House of
Representatives: (1948) Vol V: Col 484). This would seem to
confirm Zizek's observation that '[t]he national Thing exists as
long as members of the community believe in it' (Zizek 1993:
202).
It follows then that the national Thing is the Cause of the
nation, that which produces the subject of the nation (Zizek
1991a: 165) around a field of 'enjoyment', the national Cause
being 'the privileged domain of the eruption ofenjoyment into
the social field' (Zizek 1991a: 165). This Cause 'obtains its positive
ontological consistency' (Zizek 1993: 202) through 'enjoyment',
for the Sinhala (Buddhist) nation that is implicitly privileged by
this body ofcitizenship legislation 'exists only as long as its specific
enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set ofsocial practices
and transmitted through national myths that structure these
practices' (ibid, his emphasis). As such then, one form of
'enjoy~ent' that sustains the Sinhala Buddhist nation is the
violenc;e intrinsic to the practice of Sinhalese nationalism
(Kapferer 1988: 99-103). As a contingent moment then, what
this legislation reveals is notonly the {im}possibility ofa consistent
and closed definition of the category ofcitizenship analogous to
the (im)possibility of the 'Sinhala nation' itselt but also its
possibility as confirmed in the 're·mainder of some real,
nondiscursive kernel of enjoyment which must be present for
the Nation [and citizenship legislation] qua discursive entity-
effect to achieve its ontological consistency' (Zizek 1993: 202,
my interpolation, his emphasis).20
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Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism is then one such moment
of the 'eruption of enjoyment into the social field' (Zizek 1993:
202). Characteristic ofthese debates is the attribution by Sinhalese
poli~icians, that the Indian Tamil other 'wants to steal our
enjoyment (by ruining our way of life)' (Zizek 1993: 203), by
'stealing' our land and our jobs, our medical services, and our
parliamentary representation. What is ofconcern to the Sinhalese
then is the manner in which the other 'organises his enjoyment'
(Zizek 1993: 203), for the other is simultaneously both
hardworking and a 'thief' (Zizek 1993: 203) and citizenship is a
means by which the 'enjoyment' of the other can be regulated.
In a paradoxical move, the national Thing, apossession that would
allow the 'Sinhala nation' 'to live fully' (Zizek 1993: 204),
although inaccessible 'to the other', is simultaneously 'threathened
by him' (Zizek 1993: 203).
It follows that this paradox betrays a certain fragility that
undermines the possibility of the 'Sinhala nation' ever having an
identity in itself When Sinhalese politicians impute to the Indian
Tamil other, that they have 'stolen' the land, medical services
and parliamentary representation, what following Zizek they
'conceal ... is the traumatic fact that we neverpossessed what was
allegedly stolen ftom us' (Zizek 1993: 203, his emphasis), as the
ISinhala nation' can only constitute its own 'enjoyment' through
a narrative trope in which the other 'steals' that very 'enjoyment'.
It follows that the Sinhalese can only constitute their own
'enjoyment' through a narrative ofdeprivation, the other having
deprived the Sinhalese 'of the vital part of enjoyment the
possession of which would allow it to live fully' (Zizek 1993:
204).21 This fantasy of deprivation is 'rooted in hatred of one's
own enjoyment' (Zizek 1993: 204), a movement of fantasy
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through which the Sinhalese 'repress their own enjoyment by
means ofobsessional activit}', and it is this very enjoyment which
returns in the real, in the figure' (Zizek 1993: 204, his emphasis)
of the 'filthy Tamil', a popular trope in the everyday language of
the Sinhalese (Gombrich 1988: 213), who both works hard and
steals our (Sinhalese) jobs.22
But that which institutes the dynamic of the 'theft of
enjoyment' is not the actual reality that the In-dian Tamil other
happens to live in the predominantly Sinhalese province ofKandy,
'but the inner antagonism inherent' (Zizek 1993: 205, his
emphasis) in ·the 'Sinhala nati.on' itself, (which remains both
explicit and implicit in these debates on citizenship), by which
the perception ofthe other is 'mediated by a symbolic-ideological
structure which tries to cope with social antagonism) (Zizek 1993:
205). As such, 'the real "secretm (ibid) of the Indian Tamil is the
antagonism inherent to the 'Sinhala nation' itself: its inability to
achieve authenticity. It is through this process of displacement
'that desire is constituted' (Zizek 1993: 206, his emphasis). It is
through the discourse on citizenship and its attendant legislation,
the purpose ofwhich is to 'restore' the land back to the Kandyan
peasantry (Hansard House ofRepresentatives (1948) Vol IV: Col
451-55), that the Sinhalese (by transposing the inherent social
antagonism ofthe 'Sinhala nation onto the other) constitute the
'fantasy-organisation of desire' (Zizek 1993: 2(6) through the
narrative of (deprivation', the 'theft of enjoyment' .
As Zizek observes such a narrative exemplifies that
'enjoyment is ultimately always enjoyment of the Other, ie.
enjoyment supposed, imputed to the Other, and that, conversely,
the hatred of the Other's enjoyment is always the hatred ofone's
S6
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own enjoyment' (Zizek 1993: 206). Such fantasies of the Indian
Tamil other's form of 'excessive enjoymene (Zizek 1993: 206),
such as his/her 'special relationship' (Zizek f993: 206) to work
or to the land is a means by which the Sinhalese 'organise [their]
own enjoyment' (Zizek 1993: 206, my interpolation). The other
'gives a body' (ibid) to the inherent social antagonism of the
'Sinhala nation' itself and in doing so prevents the nation from
achieving a full identity with itself (Zizek 1993: 206). What we
encounter then in the articulation of the Indian Tamil other as a
'thiefofenjoyment' is the Real, that traumatic moment in which
the Symbolic order of the 'Sinhala nation' fails (Zizek 199: 20B-
11), in a manner analogous to the failure of.language to ever
attain pure signification.
The narrative of,theft' is the means by which the Sinhalese
organise their 'enjoyment'. But the role of 'enjoyment' is that it
gives effect to the structuration ofSinhalese 'desire around some
traumatic element that cannot be symbolised' (Saled 1994: 15),
the nation-Thing, around which 'reality' is constituted. This is a
'reality' determined by fantasy. As Selecl observes '[s)ocia:l reality
is always traversed by some fundamental impossibility, by an
'antagonism' which prevents reality from being fully symbolised'
(Saled 1994: 15). She continues that' [it] is fantasy that attempts
to symbolise or otherwise fill out this empty place ofsocial reality.
Fantasy thus functions as a scenario that conceals the ultimate
inconsistency of society' (Saled 1994: 15).
But what the citizenship legislation and the debates
surrounding this legislation demand is a 'stable and clearly defined
social body' (Zizek 1993: 211), one that cuts 'off the 'excessive'
element' (ibid) and restores the 'Sinhala nation' to harmony. But
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this demand is destined to fail for what it displaces is the
antagonism that is inherent to the 'Sinhala nation itself (Zizek
1993: 210). What the Indian Tamil other displaces is the
(im)possibility of symbolising the (Sinhala nation). The nation
hence occupies the place of the Real, in that the nation 'is an
element in us that is 'more than our selves', something that defines
us, but is at the same time always undefinable' (Saled 1994: 15).
Citizenship is one means by which the ~emptyplace ofthe nation
in the symbolic structure of society' (Salecl 1994: 15) is filled
out. As such Ceylon citizenship is organised around fantasy and
is a means by which the Sinhalese Buddhist nation can perceive
'itself as a homogeneous entity' (Salecl1994: 15).
Such an analysis reveals that the construction ofcitizenship
legislation in Sri Lanka as a discursive process functions by virtue
of its (fantasy-support' (Zizek 1993: 213). To the extent that
citizenship constitutes a discourse in which its object(s) are
constructed, fantasies organised around the 'deprivation' ofland,
medical services, and parliamentary representation, constitute a
'limit' that prevents the linguistic signs that make up Ceylon
"citizenship from ever achieving a self-referential unity. That which
is partially excluded in the affirmation of ci~izenshipremains at
the presubjective level of the unconscious (Obeyesekere 1990:
278), but momentarily reveals itself in the 'ambivalence towar.d
the [Indian Tamil] othees fantasmatic enjoyment' (Zizek 1993:
213, my interpolation), an excessive 'enjoyment' which is
encompassed within the hierarchical set of criteria established
for the granting of citizenship in this legislation.
It follows that the determination of citizenship only
succeeds in the paradoxical moment that announces the failure
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of its universalisation, 'the very moment of its splitting' (Zizek
1993: 222), a moment marked by-the partial separation of the
'inside' - citizenship - from the 'outside' - statelessness (Zizek
1993: 222). The classification of 'Ceylon citizenship' operates in
a manner that seeks to encompass the 'explosive potential' (Zizek
1993: 222) ofthe Indian Tamil other 'even if the price to be paid
for such containment is the neglect of elementary democratic
principles' (Zizek 1993: 222). Consequently, following Hegel,
the collective Indian Tamil populace constitute a 'rabble' (cited
by Zizek 1993: 224), the inevitable by-product of establishing
Ceylon citizenship. As such they constitute a partially integrated
'segment in the legal order, prevented from partaking of its
beneH rs, and for this very reason delivered from any
responsibilities toward it - a necessary structural surplus [partially]
excluded from the closed circuit of [the] social edifice' (Zizek
1993: 224, my interpolation).
Conclusion
The Sinhalese narrative on citizenship and its attendant legislation
is a 'tale ofethnic roots' (Zizek 1993: 232), the articulation of a
'myth of ... Origins' (Zizek 1993: 232). Its function is that of
displacement, an 'ideological fossil created retroactive1yj (Zizek
1993: 232) by nationalist discourse 'in order to blur' (Zizek 1993:
232) or mask over the antagonism inherent in the Sinhalese
Buddhist nation itse1f(Zizek 1993: 232). The categoryof'Ceylon
citizenship' reveals the fact that the Indian Tamil other was never
excluded, but never included either. The failure to exclude the
other and its continued insistence as an excessive moment that
guarantees the very (im)possibility of citizenship ensures that
citizenship can have no self-constituting foundation and yet
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remains 'unable to accommodate the difference' (Perrin 1996:
107) that is the other. Ifcitizenship devoid of 'ethnic roots' could
ever be established, such a realisation would paradoxically signal
its dissolution as citizenship would leave behind any relation to
the other.
Drawing an analogy between my earlier discussion of the
relation between the Tamil other as an experience at the 'limit' of
the 'Sinhala nation', the 'limit' of citizenship, the other, can
similarly 'be understood as insurpassable; as a line which crosses
[citizenship] and which redraws itself every time it is crossed'
(Perrin 1996: 107, my interpolation). Citizenship in Sri Lanka
is confronted by the (im)possibility of forgetting the other, and
yet paradoxically it is in this (im) possible forgetting that
citizenship may be said to have a beginning, but a beginning
that cannot consign the other to the past (Perrin 1996: 108-9).
Notes
Sri Lanka (or Ceylon until 1972) gained independence from
Britain in 1948. The Sinhalese (pr~dominantly Buddhist)
comprise 74 percent of the population, the Tamils
(predominantly Hindu) comprise 18.2 percent, the Muslims
who are the descendants ofboth Arab traders and Tamil Hindu
and possibly Sinhalese Buddhist converts to Islam comprise 7.1
percent, the Burghers (descendants of Portuguese and Dutch
settler communities) and Eurasians comprise 0.3 percent, the
Malays comprise 0.3 percent and the Veddhas (the indigenous
inhabitants ofthe island) and other ethnic groups comprise 0.2








The debates surrounding the law on citizenship are dominated
by the, metaphor of 'deprivation', that is that the Indian Tamil
other stole or took away certain privileges once enjoyed by the
Sinhalese people and as such is open to an analysis that utilises
a psychoanalytical account of nationalism as the 'theft of
enjoyment' (Zizek 1991a, 1993).
PaH, a language derived from Sanskrit, is the sacred script of
Buddhism. Buddhism arrived in Sri Lanka in approximately
250 BCE from North India (Gombrich 1988: 1-3).
Dharmapala was born into a mercantile Buddhist famil}'" Under
the influence of Madame Blavatsky he was introduced to
Theosophy and learnt Pali. He adopted the name Dharmapala
which means 'Defender ofthe Buddhist Doctrine'. The reference
to 'Anagarika' was an innovation and in Pali it means 'homeless',
the cl~ssic epithet for a Buddhist monk (Gombrich &
Obeyesekere 1988: 205-6).
In Ben Anderson's account, nations 'are to be distinguished,
not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they
are imagined' (Anderson 1991: 6).
As an 'excess' which is alwayssurplus to that which can be actually
identified (Bhabha 1994:66-84), the Tamil other succeeds in
breaching the boundary and distorting the outline of the
Sinhalese Buddhist nation's claimed self-identity (Perrin 1996:
104). The boundary (ie. the external 'limit') of the nation's seIf-
identity confronts its 'limit', what it can never fully be as it
finds itself tethered to the 'excess' that is the other. This internal
'limit' prevents the Sinhalese nation from achieving a full identity
with itself (Zizek 1991b: l02-12). Simultaneous to the failure
ofa full identity is the ultimate failure of exclusion. Its identity
fails through the undecidable relation between the Sinhalese











this failure to either exclude or include the other which
undermines the coherence of the 'Sinhala nation).
For a detailed analysis of the operation of the Donoughmore
Constitution and its impact on Tamil politics and the gradual
fragmentation ofSinhala-Tamil relations see Russell (1982).
In addition Russell notes that 'the struggle for leadership within
the Sinhalese and Tamil communities themsdves caused rifts
which inhibited united communal political action.... The
centripetal social forces within each community were not
powerful enough to counteract the fissiparative tendencies)
(Russell 1982: 334).
As a consequence of the Citizenship Act, the electoral register
had to be amended. The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections)
AmendmentAct, 1949 had the effect of removing those Indian
Tamil voters who had been disenfranchised of citizenship by
the former Act from the electoral register. Not only did this
remove a potential source ofsupport for the Left from electoral
politics, but in distorting the electoral balance it had the effect
of making the 'Sinhalese rural voter the arbiter of the country's
politics' (de Silva 1986: 155») as confirmed with the results of
the 1956 general election when the forces ofSinhalese Buddhist
, nationalism came to power.
Instead the provisions of the Act are outlined in liberal neutral
terms.
I am grateful to Colin Perrin for this citation.
The current exchange rate is about 100 Rupees to 1 Pound
sterling. It only takes a small leap of imagination to realise how
out of reach 2000 Rupees would have been to a plantation
labourer 50 years ago.
The Left, the Federal Party (which split from theTamil Congress






the Ceylon Indian Congress opposed the legislation on the
grounds that it was racist, its sole objective being to facilitate
communal passions, and the Left added with good reason that
it was overtly anti-working class, as a majority of the Indian
Tamils had voted for the Left in the 1948 general election
(Hansard House ofRepresentatives (1948) Vol V: Col 457-58,
557-58, 578-80).
In fact under the Medical1.%nts Ordinance, Indian labourers
were not entitled to free treatment in hospitals opened in the
plantation areas and had to pay 30 cents (Hansard House of
Representatives (1948) Vol V: Col 533).
This idyllic rural setting, often associated with the pre-colonial
past, was organised around the central symbols of the Buddhist
temple, the water-tank and the village (Tambiah 1992: 112).
This is not where the story ofcitizenship legislation in Sri Lanka
ends, but my own analysis here is confined "to the 1948-49
period. In 1964 and 1974 agreements were negotiated between
the Indian and Sri Lankan governments 'according to which
the Sri Lankan government agreed to award citizenship to
approximately 46.2 per cent ofInclians (and their descendants)
living in Sri Lanka in 1948' (de Silva in Goldman & Jeyaratnam
Wilson (eds) 1984: 118). The Indian Government 'agreed to
accept the others, and by 1980 there were approximately 400,000
Indian Tamils who had gained Sri Lankan citizenship' (de Silva
in Goldman & Jeyaratnam Wilson (eds) 1984: 112). Finally in
1986 the Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act had the
effect of granting citizenship by registration to the remaining
469,000 Indian Tamils.
This reference to the Thing is used in its Lacanian 'sense as a
traumatic, real object fixing our desire' (Zizek 1991a: 162), the
object filling out the place of 'the trauma as memory' (Forrester








observes that 'according to Freud we must dissociate secondary
repression (which gives rise to the "formations" of the dream,
the symptom ... (and] all the representations of the unconscious
on the edges of the conscious scene) from what Lacan called the
Thing, and Freud the unconscious affect, which never let
themselves be presented' (Lyotard 1991: 33). So primary
repression for Freud is analogous to the Lacanian Thing, that
which remains inaccessible, but which yet must be filled out
through fantasy.
This experience is analogous to tharoE castration, which for
Freud is 'experienced as something that "really cannot happen",
but.whose prospect ~evertheless horrifies us' (Zizek 1991a: 165).
'Enjoyment' (jouissance) 'is not to be equated with pleasure
(Lust) ... [for] it designates the paradoxical satisfaction procured
by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the
equilibrium of t.he "pleasure principle". In other words,
enjoyment is located "beyond the pleasure principle'" (Zizek
1993: 280, n I, my interpolation).
In Lacanian terms the 'Real is a dimension which is always
;"1issing, but which at the same time always emerges; this elusive
dimension, which society tries to incorporate in the symbolic
order and thus neutraJise, always exceeds society's grasp' (Saled
1994: 15). Although the Symbolic order is oriented towards
equilibrium 'it can never attain this state because of this alien,
traumatic dimension at its core' {Saled 1994: IS}.
Zizek, in this respect, develop~ Jacques-Alain Miller's question
C[w]hat is the cause ofour hatred ofhim in his very being? It is
hatred of the enjoyment in the Other. This would be the most
general formula of the modern racism we are witnessing today:
a hatred 9fthe.particular way the Other enjoys.... The question
of tolerance or intolerance is ... located on the level of tolerance
or intolerance toward the enjoyment <;>f the Other, the Other as
22
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he who essentially steals my enjoyment ... The problem is
apparently unsolvable as the Other is the Other in my interior.
The root of racism is thus hatred ofmy-own enjoyment. There
is no other enjoyment but my own. If the Other is in me,
occupying the place ofextimacy, then the hatred is also my own'
(cited by Zizek 1993: 203). .
The ~theft of enjoyment' in this respect follows the logic of
paranoia, which consists of the 'externalisation of the function
of castration in a positive agency appearing as the "thief of
enjoyment))) (Zizek 1993: 281, n 7). Elaborating upon Zizek's
argument the paranoia of the 'Sinhala nation' may be said to
result from the failure of the 'Sinhala nation' to establish itself
as sufficiently Sinhalese Buddhist. This failure, predetermined
by the very structure ofthe Symbolic order "'returns in the real))
in the shape ofthe Other, the "thiefofenjoyment))) (Zizek 1993:
281, n 7).
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